Hegemony and Scientific Creativity

Is sustained excellence and creativity nurtured when a nation-state is ‘powerful’? Is there a connection between hegemony and scientific creativity?

Maybe, as illustrated by this simple sketch. But it needs to be explained.

It comes from the first chapter of Exceptional Creativity in Science and Technology: Individuals, Institutions, and Innovations, edited by Andrew Robinson and published in 2013 by Templeton Press. Chapter One, by J. Rogers Hollingsworth and David M. Gear is titled The Rise and Decline of Hegemonic Systems of Scientific Creativity.

First, we need to define some terms. The word hegemon from ancient Greek means ‘leader’. The authors define a “hegemonic power [as] one that exercises political, economic and military supremacy over all other powers during a particular historic period… [and this] gave birth to the creative scientific hegemon. A scientific hegemon dominates multiple scientific fields and establishes the standards of excellence in most scientific fields. Its language is the major one used in scientific communication, and its scientific elite is the one most prominent in the world of science. It attracts more foreign young people for training than any other country. Its scientific culture tends to reflect society’s culture.”

However, developing scientific hegemony is not a given even if a nation-state possesses political, economic and military hegemony. The authors argue that totalitarian governments and overly-centralized and bureaucratic systems stifle the possibility of achieving scientific dominance. Smaller institutions, interdisciplinarity, and some degree of nimbleness or adaptability seem to be important. Examples include the Salk Institute (San Diego), MRC (Cambridge), Max Planck Institutes (Germany), and more. There are also exceptional pockets of creativity without being a powerful nation-state; the standout example provide is Göttingen in the mid-1920s.

In their four examples (French, German, British, American), the authors situate the rise of scientific hegemony within the context of nation-state superpower-ness. These seem to fit well historically, and names of famous scientists are used to bolster the argument. However, it is the decline in scientific hegemony that proves more interesting. The authors argue that while the processes varied in each nation-state, the underlying reasons are the same. Particularly troubling is that “when their systems began to decline, the elites in scientific hegemons often failed to understand this fact; indeed, they tended to believe that their system were continuing to perform extraordinarily well.”

France’s heyday was roughly 1735-1850. Indeed, French scientists dominated the field and French was the language of scientific communication. Young scientists flocked to France for training. But then the double whammy of the French Revolution followed by Napoleon Bonaparte’s short-lived conquering aspirations, led to a decline in French dominance. But the authors also lay the blame on centralization of the French government. Despite losing the lead in basic science, France still managed to excel in applied science and technology, at least for a while. But by the 1850s, resources, facilities, equipment and conditions for basic research had declined significantly. The mantle of scientific creativity was shifting to Germany.

Germany’s century spanned roughly 1830-1930, peaking in the early twentieth century and experiencing a precipitous drop with the rise of the Nazi regime. Much has been written about the rise of the German research university, a model that greatly influenced the rise of research universities in the U.S. and around the world. Many young Americans went to Germany to be trained, which subsequently led to the U.S. rise with Germany’s decline as scientists flocked (back) to the U.S. Einstein, Franck, Haber, Hahn, Meitner, Polanyi, and more are among the many famous physicists who also resided at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes in Dahlem. However, Germany’s defeat in the first World War, a highly disrupted economy, and skyrocketing inflation led to a loss in German hegemony. A decline in scientific prominence followed quickly.

Britain’s heyday was roughly 1870-1965. The great British empire was global in scope, its navy was the envy of the world, and it dominated world trade. The authors focus on Cambridge as the example par excellence of scientific hegemony. Catalyzed by German advances, the British government began pouring resources into its universities and emphasizing scientific research. The Cavendish Laboratory was founded in 1871; its inaugural director, the great James Clerk Maxwell. The authors write: “No department has ever had so many distinguished scientists as the Cavendish Laboratory. Indeed, this single department has received more Nobel Prizes for work actually done at the Cavendish than all of France’s and Italy’s Nobel laureates combined. Yet the distinction of the Cavendish was only the top of the iceberg of the greatness of British science…”

The U.S. is currently still acknowledged as the world leader in science. It has also been the sole global superpower since the end of the Cold War, although the rise of China is challenging U.S. supremacy today – in all areas, science included. Five years ago when this book was published, the authors caution the U.S. not to be complacent. “As the French, German and British economies declined, so did their science systems. Each former scientific power, especially during the initial stages of decline, had the illusion that its system was performing better than it actually was, overestimating its strength and underestimating innovation elsewhere.”

The authors spend a moment surveying the landscape of present-day science. In particular, there is an interesting discussion of ‘large-scale’ science in ever increasing team sizes. But does moving towards ‘big science’ also encourage the building in of constraints to research? Organization has become much more complicated, be it in scientific organizations or in universities. The administrative layering coupled with the business and legal arms of the university has led to “universities becoming like holding companies, with universities glad to have the staff as long as they can bring in large research grants and pay substantial overhead costs… [but] this kind of structure has become dysfunctional…”

A list of “Characteristics of Organizational Contexts that Facilitate Major Discoveries” is provided by the authors based on their historical analysis. Here’s my summary.

·      Capable and visionary organizational leadership

·      Moderately high scientific diversity (not too much overspecialization)

·      Effective communication and social integration across the organization

·      Recruiting the right people

·      Organizational autonomy and flexibility

On the other hand, isolation/separation of different departments, hierarchical-centralized decision-making systems, bureaucracy, are among characteristics that constrain major discoveries. Interestingly, hyperdiversity is also mentioned in this list although no explanation is provided why this might be. Finding a long-term balance between science commercialization and basic discovery research will also prove challenging. The authors put in a plug for smaller, more nimble organizations with higher autonomy, as a counterweight to ‘big science’.

Should a fifth curve be added with the rise of Asia as a whole and China in particular? Maybe the U.S. curve is already dipping and we just don’t know it yet. Certainly, we live in interesting times.