Studying complex systems via computational modelling can
lead you far afield to interesting ideas. This week I read several papers on
the Garbage Can Model and how it might describe the decision-making processes
(or lack thereof) in universities. I first read the original 1972 paper describing
the model. (Abstract and citation in figure below.)
The system being modeled is “organized anarchy”; the authors
claim that universities are a prototype of organized anarchy. Such systems have
three general properties. First, problematic preferences means that the
organization “operates on the basis of a variety of inconsistent and
ill-defined preferences [and] can be described better as a loose collection of
ideas than as a coherent structure…” Second, unclear technology refers
to a lack of understanding among members of the organization. The system
therefore “operates on the basis of simple trial-and-error procedures, the
residue of learning from accidents of past experience, and pragmatic inventions
of necessity.” Third, fluid participation means that time, effort and
involvement may have wide variation, and therefore “the boundaries of the organization
are uncertain and changing; the audiences and decision makers for any
particular kind of choice changes capriciously.” Sound familiar?
In particular, the authors are interested in studying (1) how
such organizations make choices in the absence of consensus, (2) how
participants become “actively” involved when “not everyone is attending to
everything all of the time”. At its base, the model assumes four independent
streams that vary temporally: Problems, Solutions, Participants, and Choice
Opportunities. There are varying flow rates of different streams, and a
nebulous “energy” term is needed to solve (or in most cases) resolve a problem.
Sounds like a multidimensional kinetics problem of a complex system, at least
to me, the physical chemist. The 1972 paper details the model and includes a full
Fortran program for users to tinker with the model and its parameters.
How can decisions be made in the model? The one we all
assume: By resolving a problem that shows up, after working on it for some
time. But there are two others. By oversight – there’s a norm, and it is
simply applied without much time and energy. Or by flight, i.e., the
problem is simply punted and not resolved, as new problems come in. The
participants have simply re-attached themselves to new and different incoming
problems. To see the model and simulation statistics, I recommend reading the
paper in full. For this blog post, I wanted to highlight the implications of
the results as described by the authors. A note of caution: the model is very
simplistic, so one should be wary about the strength of the conclusions. That
being said, as an academic I find the qualitative descriptions familiar-sounding.
“University decision making frequently does not resolve
problems… Decisions whose interpretations continuously change during the
process of resolution… Problems, choices, and decision makers arrange and
rearrange themselves. In the course of these [re]arrangements the meaning of a
choice can change several times… Problems are often solved, but rarely by the
choice to which they are first attached. A choice that might, under some
circumstances, be made with little effort becomes an arena for many problems…
The matching of problems, choices, and decision makers is partly controlled by
attributes of content, relevance and competence; but it is also quite sensitive
to attributes of timing, the particular combinations of current garbage cans,
and the overall load on the system.”
The 1972 paper has some interesting graphs. Above is Figure
5 from the paper looking at how different hypothetically sized schools with
different baseline resources might change the way decisions are made depending
on whether times are plentiful or lean. The authors make some predictions based
on their model. “As adversity continues… all schools, and particularly rich
schools, will experience improvement [i.e. resort to ‘higher efficiency’] in
their position… Presidents of such organizations might feel a sense of success
in their efforts to tighten up the organization in response to resource
contraction.” Interestingly, small selective liberal arts colleges with large
endowments are in the ‘unsegmented’ decision structure, i.e., they remain less
hierarchical than their counterparts although as the famine approaches, they
may cross the border into the ‘hierarchical’ decision structure.
The authors conclude: “It is clear that the garbage can
process does not resolve problems well. But it does enable choices to be made
and problems resolved, even when the organization is plagued with goal
ambiguity and conflict, with poorly understood problems that wander in and out
of the system, with a variable environment, and with decision makers who may
have other things on their minds.” Sound familiar?
How has the Garbage Can model fared over time? Not very well
because there are fundamental flaws as described in a 2001 paper by Bendor, Moe
and Shotts. (See abstract and citation in figure above.) The authors think this
is unfortunate because the “[original] paper is brimming with provocative
insights that offer a promising basis for theory, but thus far their potential
has largely gone untapped.” Their review and critique is comprehensive; I
recommend reading the paper in full. I will highlight two significant issues.
First, there is a disconnect between the verbal form of the theory and its
heavily constrained incarnation within the model. Everyone should remember the
dictum: All models are wrong, but some are useful. But in this case, the
conclusions drawn may have well exceeded what the model is able to do given its
limitations and strictures. The verbal articulations do not match up well with
the mathematical constraints and rules. Second, the model neglects the role of individuals
and how they actually behave when problems arrive. Depending on their role in
the organization and their relative expertise, there could be a number of
specific feedback loops crucial to the model. The independent stream
assumption coupled with a linear temporal flow is unrealistic, possibly to the
breaking point. However, the authors hope that the model will be revamped
significantly so that it might actually prove insightful.
One example that tries to improve on the model is recasting
it as agent-based. The authors, Fioretti and Lomi, also add several features to
the model. (Abstract and citations shown below.) Flight (i.e., not
resolving the problem) can now be postponement (per the original) but also passing-the-buck.
I can personally attest that both happen very often at multiple administrative
levels in the university. At first glance, this might seem to be a bad thing –
but the simulation shows some interesting results.
The authors also compare and contrast organized anarchy with
two different hierarchical setups. (In a hierarchy, “participants are only
allowed to make decisions on choice opportunities that are equally or less
important than their own hierarchical level.”) In the competent
hierarchy, participants higher up in the hierarchy have the greatest ability to
‘solve problems’. In the incompetent hierarchy, the opposite is true.
The higher-ups have lower ability to ‘solve problems’. Problems are narrowly
defined to be technical, and solutions to problems also have narrow
characteristics –read the paper in full for details. Again, there are some
surprises. The incompetent hierarchy may actually outperform the other
systems under some desired metrics/outcomes.
Fioretti and Lomi have worked on confirming the decision-making
characteristics outlined by the original 1972 model. Three are highlighted by the
authors. (I have modified their quotes slightly for clarity.)
·
Decisions by oversight
are much more common than decisions made by resolution suggesting that
the rational mode of decision-making is rare (< 20%). Most decisions are
socially induced acts, made with the purpose of obtaining legitimacy by
conforming to required rituals.
·
In a hierarchy, top
executives are busy gaining legitimacy for their organization by means of decisions
by oversight, whereas the [lower-level] bottom line cares about solving
[technical] problems.
·
Organizations make
themselves busy with a few problems that present themselves again and again. So
participants have the impression of facing the same problems repeatedly.
Sound familiar?
There are several interesting conclusions (again, subject to
the limitations of the extended model). Postponement and passing-the-buck can
be “beneficial to an organization, since they avoid members wasting time on
problems they cannot solve… they channel the most difficult problems to the
best problem-solvers, creating opportunities for them to display their
abilities.” Another surprising observation is that contrary to common wisdom,
it is NOT necessary that the most capable problem solvers sit at the top of the
hierarchy. Instead, good “socializers” who can “obtain legitimacy” for the organization
should be the high-level “managers”. That already happens in many cases, but
that means that the different roles in a hierarchical structure simply emphasize
different strengths. The disparity in compensation seems particularly
outlandish in this light – unless one values the social aspect much more highly
over the technical aspects. The authors carefully state that “incompetence at
problem solving should not be confused with [overall] incompetence… [and] top
decision-makers should be good at gaining legitimacy for their organization,
which is possibly the kind of ability they should be selected for.”
While I think the garbage can model is still too crude to
establish particular practices for organized anarchy and hierarchical systems,
it did remind me that I should be a little more understanding when the system
doesn’t “work” as efficiently – i.e., the person I think should solve a problem
postpones or passes-the-buck. Not because I think that’s the right response in
the particular cases I’m thinking about, but that being in the midst of an
organized anarchy leads to certain behavioral ‘ruts’ – explicable to some
extent by systemic issues. The papers also made me think about how encountering
different modeling approaches to complex systems in areas vastly different from
my own, has expanded my horizons. Organized anarchy seems oxymoronic, but it’s
also a good description for thermodynamics. Are
managers simply needed to control entropy?